This paper shows that imperfect information about school quality causes low-income families to live in neighborhoods with lower-performing, more segregated schools. We randomized the addition of school quality information onto a nationwide website of housing listings for families with housing...

While leveraging parents has the potential to increase student performance, programs that do so are often costly to implement or they target younger children. We partner text-messaging technology with school information systems to automate the gathering and provision of information to parents at...

This paper shows that imperfect information about school quality causes low-income families to live in neighborhoods with lower-performing, more segregated schools. We randomized the addition of school quality information onto a nationwide website of housing listings for families with housing...

Managers can set explicit, binding targets to reward workers before observing their performance (ex ante contract), or decide whether to reward workers after observing their performance (ex post contract). We experimentally examine the effects of the two types of contracts on workers' behaviors...

We investigate the consequences for losing competitors following the end of a promotion tournament. We examine CEO tournaments and find that the total incentives of non-promoted executives (NPEs) are likely to decrease significantly at the end of a tournament based on evidence of their lower...

I examine the effects of providing workers with relative performance information (RPI) on employers' promotion decisions and the impact of those decisions on worker performance. In my experimental setting, the job after promotion requires higher-level abilities than the current job. I find that...

To address the empirical phenomenon that organizations often reward time on the job as an end in itself, we design an experiment in which participants solve anagram puzzles, manipulating whether a compensation pool generated from the output of paired workers is allocated based on the individual...