Exploiting the setting of staggered adoption of the Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine (hereafter IDD) in U.S. state courts, we examine how quasi-exogenous restrictions of outside employment opportunities affect CEOs' risk preferences. IDD adoption constrains executives' ability to work for...

We document that firms whose compensation peers experience weak say on pay votes reduce CEO compensation following those votes. Reductions reflect proxy adviser concerns about peers' compensation contracts and are stronger when CEOs receive excess compensation, when they compete more closely...

There are several measures of equity compensation that may provide shareholders with distinct and useful information for evaluating CEO pay. We examine whether shareholders consider additional disclosures of equity compensation measures beyond the grant date fair value when participating in...

We examine the role personal compensation incentives of CMOs and CEOs play in inducing myopic marketing management. We find that CEO equity incentives are largely unrelated to the incidence and severity of myopic marketing management. CMO equity compensation, on the other hand, is highly...

This M.A. dissertation presents a study of the influence of financial distress on CEO compensation in the United States. It focuses on the four main components of executive compensation: salary, bonus, restricted stock and stock options. More specifically, I apply linear regression to panel data...

In the aftermath of the 2007-2008 financial crisis, flawed variable pay structures of executives were blamed by many for contributing to the build-up of the global financial turmoil, as they allegedly incentivized them to engage in excessive risk-taking. Legislators around the globe decided to...

This article analyzes taxpayer data to look at companies that exceed the section 162(m) executive compensation deduction limit. These findings raise serious questions about the management of compensation boards acting in the fiduciary interest of shareholders

We consider a model of CEO selection, dismissal and retention. Firms with larger blockholder ownership monitor more; they get more information about CEO ability, which facilitates the dismissal of low-ability CEOs. These firms are matched with CEOs whose ability is more uncertain. For retention...

We analyze how the reputational concerns of boards influence executive compensation and the use of hidden pay. Independent boards reduce disclosed pay to signal their independence, but are more likely to use inefficient hidden pay than manager-friendly boards. Stronger reputational pressures...

The question of fair executive compensation could be resolved if we develop a framework and measures to determine whether executives are compensated fairly by firms. Executive compensation is a business decision, and it should be based on business performance. This paper presents tools for...