A monopolist producing vertically differentiated durable goods can offer in each period a sequence of price-quality menus to segment the market. We show that, contrary to the Coase conjecture for the homogeneous durable good monopoly, thanks to the ability to produce differentiated durable...

When a durable good of uncertain quality is introduced to the market, some consumers strategically delay their buying to the next period with the hope of learning the unknown quality. We analyze the monopolist's pricing strategies when consumers have strategic delay incentives. We show when the...

We examine an infinite horizon model of quality growth in a durable goods monopoly market. The monopolist generates new quality improvements over time and can sell any available qualities, in any desired bundles, at each point in time. Consumers are identical and for a quality improvement to...

We consider a non-durable good monopoly that collects data on its customers in order to profile them and subsequently practice price discrimination on returning customers. The monopolist’s price discrimination scheme is leaky, in the sense that an endogenous fraction of consumers chooses to...

A durable good monopolist faces a continuum of heterogeneous customers who make purchase decisions by comparing present and expected price-quality offers. The monopolist designs a sequence of price-quality menus to segment the market. We consider the Markov Perfect Equilibrium (MPE) of a game...

We examine an infinite horizon model of quality growth in a durable goods monopoly market. The monopolist generates new quality improvements over time and can sell any available qualities, in any desired bundles, at each point in time. Consumers are identical and for a quality improvement to...

This paper studies a simultaneous-move infinite-horizon delegation game in which the principal of a durable goods monopoly entrusts pricing decisions to a manager who enjoys consuming her monetary rewards but dislikes production effort. The delegation contract allows for continual interference...

This paper measures the extent to which prices exceed marginal costs in the U.S. natural gas distributionmarket during the period 1991-2007. We find large departures from marginal cost pricing in all 50states, with residential and commercial customers facing average markups of over 40%. Based...

We consider the optimal market segmentation problem of a monopolist that faces a continuum of customers when it is costly to prevent resale (or parallel trade) among groups. In our framework, the monopolist chooses the number k of market segments, but also their design and the discriminatory...

Article 82 of EC Treaty prohibits any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position; the examples contained of “abuse” reflect a variety of public policies that have led European antitrust authorities in several directions simultaneously, indicating also a highly regulatory policy...