Standard models of adverse selection in insurance markets assume policyholders know their loss distributions. This study examines the nature of equilibrium and the equilibrium value of information in competitive insurance markets where consumers lack complete information regarding their loss...

Regarding single-family residential properties purchased for investment (non-owner occupied) we examine whether out-of-state buyers pay more than in-state buyers. We focus on the effects of search costs and anchoring. We use data on 2,828 Las Vegas non-owner occupied (investor) residences, 40...

We analyze the effect of ambiguous loss probabilities on competitive insurance markets with asymmetric information. We characterize equilibria under actuarially fair pricing with preferences that are second-order ambiguity averse (have smooth indifference curves). We also show existence of...

The detection of unbiased abnormal returns in the classic event study depends on the validity of the assumption that the parameters of the return generating process remain constant throughout the sample period. However, given the substantial amount of evidence to support the fact that the market...

This study considers a single-period monopolistic insurance market with adverse selection and moral hazard. We find that, where the distortions introduced by moral hazard are sufficiently moderate, the insurer can use price-quantity contracts as a mechanism to simultaneously deal with both...