Myers and Majluf (1984) argue that informational asymmetry between managers and investors can explain the negative stock returns around the announcement of new equity. Using analyst following and consensus as proxies for information asymmetry, we observe that announcement period returns are...

This paper examines whether favorable information conveyed by stock split announcements transfers to non-splitting firms within the same industry. We find that there exists intra-industry reaction; shareholders of non-splitting firms experience significant positive abnormal returns during the...

This paper tests whether managers repurchase stock when their assessment of the firm's economic value exceeds the market value. Using the forecasts managers would have if they had perfect foresight, we estimate economic value using an earnings-based valuation model. The major findings are as...

We provide new evidence on the monitoring benefits from institutional ownership by analyzing the impact of institutional ownership on stock price and operating performance following seasoned equity offerings, a setting where the effects of monitoring are likely to be especially important. We...

We observe a persistent increase in the percentage of firms with little or no debt in their capital structure over the last three decades. The fraction of firms with less than five percent debt in their capital structure increases from 14.01 percent in 1977 to 34.42 percent in 2010 while the...

We examine whether favorable information conveyed by stock split announcements transfers to nonsplitting firms within the same industry. On average, nonsplitting firms' shareholders experience positive and significant abnormal returns at the stock split announcements of their industry...

We investigate the tradeoff theory as an explanation for how managers allocate cash to post-spin-off parent and subsidiary firms. Spin-offs provide an opportunity to examine the determinants of cash holdings free from the confounding effects of the pecking order theory. Our results indicate that...

We examine whether the agency cost arising from shareholder-bondholder conflict is an important determinant of the timing of dividend reduction decisions. Firms forced to reduce dividends owing to bond covenant violations experience lower earnings, more frequent losses, and greater earnings...

We document that chief executive officer (CEO) incentive compensation plays an important role in determining internal capital market (ICM) allocation efficiency. Our results suggest that CEO equity-based compensation can be effective in ameliorating inefficiencies in internal capital allocation...