We consider an optimal contract between an entrepreneur and an investor, where the entrepreneur is subject to a double-moral hazard problem (one being the choice of production effort and the other being earnings manipulation). Since the entrepreneur cannot entirely capture the results of his...

This paper considers a financing problem for an innovative firm that is considering launching a web-based platform. Our model is the first one that analyzes an entrepreneur's choice between security tokens (via a security token offering (STO)) and utility tokens (via initial coin offering...

We consider a model where wealth-constrained entrepreneurs have private information about the qualities of available investment projects. We show that some "high risk-high return" projects will receive external financing even if they are not socially profitable. Some "low risk-low return"...

This note provides an explanation for why tax rates on capital gains are usually lower than ordinary income tax rates based on manager's agency problem related to "empire-building" and the underinvestment problem

This note provides an explanation for why tax rates on capital gains are usually lower than ordinary income tax rates based on manager's agency problem related to "empire-building" and the underinvestment problem

Existing literature on property rights stresses the effect that distortions in future investment decisions have on establishing the optimal property rights. This paper demonstrates that property rights may also be affected by contracts, which exist prior to the establishment of property rights....

This article provides an overview of literature related to capital structure theories for entrepreneurial firms. It identifies gaps and controversial areas in existing literature and also discusses potential directions for future research. Credit rationing, signalling by risk-bearing, the...