Stock-market short-termism—stemming from rapid trading and activists looking for quick cash—is, a widespread view has it, hurting the American economy. Because stock markets will not support corporate long-term planning, the thinking goes, companies fail to invest enough, do not do enough...

This paper explores how diversity among lead partner teams (LPTs) of private equity (PE) funds affects buyout performance. We argue that there is a trade-off between the “bright side” of diversity, i.e., improved decision-making due to a broader set of perspectives, and the “dark side”,...

We study whether firm managers’ physical appearance affects their decisions on corporate philanthropy. Examining a large sample of corporate donations matched with managers’ attractiveness data, we find that male managers’ motivations for philanthropic giving are driven by their physical...

We study the efficacy of remote working arrangements between CEOs and firms. Long-distance CEOs underperform according to operating performance, firm valuation, insider reviews, and announcement returns to CEO departures. These effects are stronger when the CEO lives further away and crosses...

In corporate law policymaking, there is considerable attention to stock market short-termism. Public discourse pins some noticeable part of the blame for climate change, environmental damage, and mistreatment of stakeholders on stock market short-termism. Presidential candidates raise the issue...

We investigate the effect of CEO hedging on the likelihood and characteristics of M&A decisions. Because of their higher degree of risk tolerance, hedged CEOs are more likely to engage in M&As and are more likely to acquire private and smaller targets. M&A deals by hedged CEOs appear to create...

This paper investigates market reaction to, and insiders’ trading around, CEO succession events. Investors seem to react negatively to CEO resignation, but not to CEO retirement or death. Further, while investors do not react negatively to CEO turnover in high effective firms, their reaction...

We test the seminal Grossman and Hart (1988) model on the optimality of the one-share-one-vote share structure against the dual-class share structure in a laboratory experiment. Our result shows qualitative support to their theoretical prediction asserting that the more efficient contender of...

We test the seminal Grossman and Hart (1988) model on the optimality of the one-share-one-vote share structure against the dual-class share structure in a laboratory experiment. Our result shows qualitative support to their theoretical prediction asserting that the more efficient contender of...

We examine Korean business groups' transitions from circular-shareholding to (relatively simple) pyramidal-shareholding structures during 2011-2018. The transition did not impact chaebol families' degrees of control or incentive conflicts in firms belonging to circular-shareholdings ("loops"),...