We analyze the impact of the bank CEO’s pay-risk sensitivity (‘vega’) on four loan contract terms, loan spreads, existence of collateral, and the number and strictness of covenants. Using a bank-level fixed effects model to control for time-invariant bank characteristics, we find that...

In this paper we examine changes in the relationship between bank risk and the structure of bank CEO compensation following the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010. Using a diff-in-diff methodology, we find significant differences between high and low pay-risk sensitivity banks....

This article suggests that the introduction of bank branching restrictions and federal deposit insurance in the United States likely was motivated by political considerations. Specifically, we argue that these restrictions are instituted for the benefit of the small unit banks that were unable...

This paper examines reasons for alliance formation between private equity bidders when compared to sole-sponsored private equity deals. Testing a comprehensive set of hypotheses, we find strong evidence for the relative-risk hypothesis of Robinson (2008), as private bidders are more likely to...

This paper examines an effect of deregulating the market for corporate control on CEO compensation in the banking industry. Given that each state's banking regulation defines the competitiveness of its corporate control market, we examine the effect of a state's interstate banking regulation on...