This paper examines how the degree of interbank competition affects real economic growth, growth patterns, and consumer welfare using a dynamical systems approach. Risk averse agents insure against idiosyncratic risk via deposit contracts that maximize bank profits. These contracts are derived...

We examine the effects of incentives in a simple model, where a set of rational agents works on a joint task. In the static model, we show that higher incentives (i.e., higher rewards for success) positively affect the success rate and the agents’ payoffs. This is in contrast to the dynamic...

We examine the persistence of monopolies in markets with innovations when the outcome of research is uncertain. We show that for low success probabilities of research, the incumbent can seldom preempt the potential entrant. Then the efficiency effect outweighs the replacement effect. It is vice...

We consider a principal-agent model with moral hazard where the agent's knowledge about the performance measure is ambiguous and he is averse towards ambiguity. We show that the principal may optimally provide no incentives or contract only on a subset of all informative performance measures....

We explore how the threat of entry influences the innovation activity of an incumbent. We show that the incumbent's investment is hump-shaped in the entry threat. When the entry threat is small and increases, the incumbent invests more to deter entry, or to make it unlikely. This is due to the...

We consider an economic model of child development with multiple stages. Due to incomplete information, parents are not able to tailor their investments to their child's type when the child is young. We show that incomplete information weakens the importance of early investments in children when...

We show that a steeply increasing workload before a deadline is compatible with time-consistent preferences. The key departure from the literature is that we consider a stochastic environment where success of effort is not guaranteed. -- Increasing Workload ; Deadline ; Stochasticity

We study a dynamic model of team production with moral hazard. We show that the players begin to invest effort only shortly before the time limit when the reward for solving the task is shared equally. We explore how the team can design contracts to mitigate this form of procrastination and show...