We propose a parsimonious model of information choice in a global coordination game of regime change that is used to analyze debt crises, bank runs or currency attacks. A change in the publicly available information alters the uncertainty about the behavior of other investors. Greater strategic...

We examine the system-wide effects of liquidity regulation on banks' balance sheets. In the general equilibrium model, banks have to hold liquid assets, and choose among illiquid assets varying in the extent to which they are difficult to value before maturity, e.g., structured securities. By...

We propose a parsimonious model of information choice in a global coordination game of regime change that is used to analyze debt crises, bank runs or currency attacks. A change in the publicly available information alters the uncertainty about the behavior of other investors. Greater strategic...

The routing capacity region of networks with multiple unicast sessions can be characterized using Farkas lemma as an infinite set of linear inequalities. In this paper this result is sharpened by exploiting properties of the solution satisfied by each rate-tuple on the boundary of the capacity...

Within the context of games on networks S. Goyal (Goyal (2007), pg. 39) posed the following problem. Under any arbitrary but fixed topology, does there exist at least one pure Nash equilibrium that exhibits a positive relation between the cardinality of a player's set of neighbors and its...

The routing capacity region of networks with multiple unicast sessions can be characterized using Farkas lemma as an infinite set of linear inequalities. In this paper this result is sharpened by exploiting properties of the solution satisfied by each rate-tuple on the boundary of the capacity...

This paper aims to study the impact of costly and private information acquisition in global games with applications in financial crisis (e.g. bank runs, currency crisis). While exogenous asymmetric information has been shown to select a unique equilibrium, we show that the endogenous costly...