This paper studies when introducing verifiable communication choices between agents in a cheap-talk benchmark setting, with social tie, is beneficial to welfare. In our model agents have two ways to communicate their private information: either through a costly verifiable information (hard) link...

We solve a model of firm dynamics with two states: cash and capital. The model high- lights how costly financing and default affect a firm’s cash management, investment, payout, and issuance policies. We find support in the data for new predictions: (1) issuance-to-capital ratios are...

This paper studies when introducing verifiable communication choices between agents in a cheap-talk benchmark setting, with social tie, is beneficial to welfare. In our model agents have two ways to communicate their private information: either through a costly verifiable information (hard) link...

We study the problem of optimal dynamic pricing for a monopolist selling a product to consumers in a social network. In the proposed model, the only means of spread of information about the product is via Word of Mouth communication; consumers' knowledge of the product is only through friends...

We introduce a general equilibrium model to analyze the interactions between liquidity regulations and banks' investment in complex assets. Complexity improves bank liquidity in good times but heightens vulnerability to runs during crises. Banks underinvest in complex assets when liquidity...

We study how the combination of market structure and the asymmetries in learn- ing technologies affects trade in a product market. In this market, a new product of unknown quality is introduced to challenge an existing product of known quality. We show that market efficiency is achieved both...

We study optimal contracting between a firm selling a divisible good that exhibits positive externality and a group of agents in a social network. The extent of externality that each agent receives from the consumption of neighboring agents is privately held and is unknown to the firm. By...