This study revisits the problem of the tragedy of the commons. Extracting agents participate in an evolutionary game in a complex social network and are subject to social pressure if they do not comply with the social norms. Social pressure depends on the dynamics of the resource, the network...

This study revisits the problem of the tragedy of the commons. Extracting agents participate in an evolutionary game in a complex social network and are subject to social pressure if they do not comply with the social norms. Social pressure depends on the dynamics of the resource, the network...

This study revisits the problem of the tragedy of the commons. Extracting agents participate in an evolutionary game in a complex social network and are subject to social pressure if they do not comply with the social norms. Social pressure depends on the dynamics of the resource, the network...

We study cooperation and group pressure in social networks by introducing a new concept termed moral ties. By combining network characteristics and agents’ actions, moral ties extend and refine the concept of social ties as a driver for group pressure. Direct moral ties depend on the size of...

This paper analyzes the influence that social networks and the state of a public good or common property resource have on compliance with social norms in relation to a social dilemma. We find that equilibria where compliers and defectors coexist (partial cooperation) can be stable and are...