I analyze sequential auctions with expectations-based loss-averse bidders who have independent private values and unit … a loss in each round in which they fail to obtain an object, bidders are willing to pay a premium to win sooner rather …

loss aversion offers a novel explanation for empirically observed differences between these auction formats. …Evidence suggests that people evaluate outcomes relative to expectations. I analyze this expectation-based loss … the (endogenous) equilibrium outcome. If agents update their reference point during the auction, the arrival of …

loss aversion offers a novel explanation for empirically observed differences between these auction formats. …Evidence suggests that people evaluate outcomes relative to expectations. I analyze this expectation-based loss … the (endogenous) equilibrium outcome. If agents update their reference point during the auction, the arrival of …

point due to updated information about others' values (i.e., the own winning probability) during the course of the auction …, and make optimal binary decisions at each price (approve or quit in the English auction and wait or bid in the Dutch … auction). First, we solve for personal equilibrium profiles, i.e., profiles of bids that contain for each bidder a bidding …

We show that it is beneficial for a buyer to conduct a multi-stage mechanism if bidders are loss averse. In a first … compared to any single-stage auction. Finally we derive the optimal efficient two-stage mechanism. …