This study develops a dynamic model of information projection and explores how it affects timing of actions. An action is observable and available only after the agents' arrival. The value of an action is unknown; however, each agent receives a noisy signal on its value. Without information...

This study analyzes the relationship between foreign suffrage and cooperation among nations, considering a three-stage game admitting strategic delegation twice. In the first delegation stage, each country chooses whether to allow foreigners to vote in the election of the country. In the second...

We study a model of two-candidate electoral competition.In our model, each voter has single-peaked preferences for the consequences of policies, but voters receive only partial information about which policies cause their preferred consequences. If voters' utility functions are convex, they...

This study examines the effect of the principal’s control over the agent’s behavior in a dynamic principal-agent model with hidden information. We show the condition that the agent who has a similar preference for actions as the principal dares to choose the unpreferred action when the...

We present a model describing an internal promotion race among individuals in different sectors where power shifts over time. The model includes a ratchet effect in which an employee attempts to manipulate their post-promotion reputation as a manager before they are promoted. The magnitude of...

Consumer behavior observations warrant a rationale for backlash against aggressive marketing instruments like assertive ads. This study examines the effects of a principal's control over an agent's behavior, employing a dynamic principal-agent model with hidden information on the agent's...