This paper studies whether greater competition can mitigate agency problems within banks. We measure the intensity of the agency conflict within a bank by the volume of loans that the bank lends to its insiders (e.g., executives). We first check that these loans are a form of private benefit. By...

This paper examines the impact of government bailouts on bank CEOs' careers. Exploiting the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) of 2008, we find that CEOs of banks that received TARP funds temporarily remained in their positions in the years 2008-2010. However, after this period, they were more...

This paper studies whether credit ratings can alleviate the hold-up problem between small opaque firms and informed banks. We exploit a refinement of the rating information produced by a state-owned rating agency and available to all lenders, which causes some firms to receive a positive rating...

Using microdata from France, we provide novel evidence that salience shapes banks’ lending decisions. Information about borrowers’ payment defaults on trade bills is publicly available to all banks, but it appears more prominently to the bank managing the payment transaction (i.e., the...

This paper studies whether greater competition can mitigate agency problems within banks. We measure the intensity of the agency conflict within a bank by the volume of loans that the bank lends to its insiders (e.g., executives). We first check that these loans are a form of private benefit. By...

Do rating announcements reduce information asymmetries? We investigate the effect of rating disclosures on the volatility and liquidity of the US bond market. Although rating agencies' decisions often are anticipated by credit spread changes, we show that in the case of no regulatory change...