In decision problems with absentmindedness the decision maker may manifest time-inconsistent choices in spite of unaltered preferences. In this paper we argue that this can be the case whenever the decision makeris reasoning is not appropriately modeled. More in particular, it is shown that the...

Morgan (Public Choice, 116:1-18, 2003) finds that the aggregate effort is greater in sequential than in simultaneous lottery contests. We show that Morgan's result is incorrect due to a slip in a proof, and that the aggregate effort is greater in sequential contests only if contestants are...

Revealed preference theory is a powerful tool for testing models of individual choice. It is now being extended to collective choice models as well. In this paper we develop tests for whether play in a game is consistent with equilibrium behavior when preferences are unobserved. We provide...

By a player splitting we mean a mechanism that distributes the information sets of a player among so-called agents. A player splitting is called independent if each path in the game tree contains at most one agent of every player. Following Mertens (1989), a solution is said to have the player...

We introduce a general class of simplicity standards that vary the foresight abilities required of agents in extensive-form games. Rather than planning for the entire future of a game, agents are presumed to be able to plan only for those histories they view as simple from their current...

This paper is a self-contained survey of algorithms for computing Nash equilibria of two-person games. The games may be given in strategic form or extensive form. The classical Lemke-Howson algorithm finds one equilibrium of a bimatrix game, and provides an elementary proof that a Nash...

I study the estimation of finite sequential games with perfect information. The major challenge in estimation is computation of high-dimensional truncated integration whose domain is complicated by strategic interaction. I show that this complication resolves when unobserved...

Previous experimental results on one-shot sequential two-player games show that group decisions are closer to the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium than individual decisions. We extend the analysis of inter-group versus inter-individual decision making by running both one-shot and repeated...

Games with imperfect information often feature multiple equilibria, which depend on beliefs off the equilibrium path. Standard selection criteria such as passive beliefs, symmetric beliefs or wary beliefs rest on ad hoc restrictions on beliefs. We propose a new selection criterion that imposes...

Games with imperfect information often feature multiple equilibria, which depend on beliefs off the equilibrium path. Standard selection criteria such as passive beliefs, symmetric beliefs or wary beliefs equilibria rest on ad hoc restrictions on beliefs. We propose a new selection criterion...