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Cultural barriers in international trade and the protection and promotion of culture

Park, Jaeok - In: The Korean economic review 31 (2015) 2, pp. 267-300

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011417814

Potential games with incomplete preferences

Park, Jaeok - In: Journal of mathematical economics 61 (2015), pp. 58-66

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011573799

Competitive equilibrium and singleton cores in generalized matching problems

Park, Jaeok - In: International journal of game theory : official journal … 46 (2017) 2, pp. 487-509

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011947265

Decision making and games with vector outcomes

Park, Jaeok - In: The B.E. journal of theoretical economics 20 (2020) 1, pp. 1-14

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012170708

Second-price auctions with sequential and costly participation

Lee, Jinhyuk; Park, Jaeok - In: Economic theory : official journal of the Society for … 62 (2016) 3, pp. 567-586

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011529374

Pricing of complementary goods as an implicit financial arrangement

Lee, Jinhyuk; Park, Jaeok - In: Hitotsubashi journal of economics 55 (2014) 2, pp. 207-228

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010502088

Repeated games with general discounting

Obara, Ichiro; Park, Jaeok - In: Journal of economic theory 172 (2017), pp. 348-375

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011777065

Signaling through entry in auctions with sequential and costly participation

Lee, Jeongwoo; Park, Jaeok - In: Economic theory 77 (2024) 4, pp. 1085-1126

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014553067

Core and top trading cycles in a market with indivisible goods and externalities

Hong, Miho; Park, Jaeok - In: Journal of mathematical economics 100 (2022), pp. 1-13

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013367184

First-Price and Second-Price Auctions with Externalities : An Experimental Study

Kim, Chulyoung; Kim, Sang-Hyun; Lee, Jinhyuk; Park, Jaeok - 2023

We consider a scenario where a single indivisible object is auctioned off to three bidders and among the three bidders there is one bidder whose winning imposes a positive or negative externality on the other two bidders. We theoretically and experimentally compare two standard sealed-bid...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014260605