Similar Search Results

Morath, Florian; Münster, Johannes - In: Economic Theory 54 (2013) 1, pp. 99-129

This paper considers incentives for information acquisition ahead of conflicts. First, we characterize the (unique) equilibrium of the all-pay auction between two players with one-sided asymmetric information where one player has private information about his valuation. Then, we use our results...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010993555

Favoritism in asymmetric contests: Head starts and handicaps

Kirkegaard, René - In: Games and Economic Behavior 76 (2012) 1, pp. 226-248

I examine a contest with identity-dependent rules in which contestants are privately informed and ex ante heterogeneous. A contestant may suffer from a handicap or benefit from a head start. The former reduces the contestantʼs score by a fixed percentage; the latter is an additive bonus....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049730

All-pay auctions with certain and uncertain prizes

Minchuk, Yizhaq; Sela, Aner - In: Games and Economic Behavior 88 (2014) C, pp. 130-134

We study all-pay auctions with multiple prizes. The players have the same value for all the certain prizes except for one uncertain prize for which each player has a private value. We characterize the equilibrium strategy and show that, independent of the ranking of the uncertain prize, if the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011117138

All-Pay Auctions: Implementation and Optimality

Jönsson, Stefan; Schmutzler, Armin - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2013

This paper analyzes how all-pay auctions with endogenous prizes can be used to provide effort incentives. We show that wide classes of effort distributions can be implemented as equilibrium outcomes of such games. We also ask how all-pay auctions have to be structured so as to induce high...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084454

Workaholics and Drop Outs in Optimal Organizations

Müller, Wieland; Schotter, A. - Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research - 2003

JEL classifications: C92; D44; J31; D72; D82;

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011090871

Contests with Random Noise and a Shared Prize

Sheremeta, Roman; Masters, William; Cason, Timothy - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2009

This note introduces a model of contests with random noise and a shared prize that combines features of Tullock (1980 …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011108366

A Survey of Experimental Research on Contests, All-Pay Auctions and Tournaments

Dechenaux, Emmanuel; Kovenock, Dan; Sheremeta, Roman - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2014

Many economic, political and social environments can be described as contests in which agents exert costly efforts … while competing over the distribution of a scarce resource. These environments have been studied using Tullock contests, all … canonical contests. First, we review studies investigating the basic structure of contests, including the number of players and …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011111456

All-Pay Auctions with Polynomial Rewards

Bos, Olivier; Ranger, Martin - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2013

&D races, lobbying activity and sport contests are captured by this framework. After analyzing the unique mixed strategy …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011114126

A Survey of Experimental Research on Contests, All-Pay Auctions and Tournaments

Dechenaux, Emmanuel; Kovenock, Dan; Sheremeta, Roman - Economic Science Institute (ESI), Argyros School of … - 2012

Many economic, political and social environments can be described as contests in which agents exert costly efforts … while competing over the distribution of a scarce resource. These environments have been studied using Tullock contests, all …-pay auctions and rank-order tournaments. This survey provides a review of experimental research on these three canonical contests …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010575500

On asymmetry in all-pay auctions

Yoon, Kiho - Institute of Economic Research, Korea University - 2012

This paper examines the role of asymmetry in all-pay auctions. In particular, this paper decomposes a change in players' valuations into the absolute change and the relative change, and analyzes how these changes a¢çect total expenditures. An increase in the sum of players' valuations...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010641739