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Kaplan, Todd; Sela, Aner - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2008

We study two-stage political contests with private entry costs. We show that these political contests could be …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504307

Carrots and Sticks: Prizes and Punishments in Contests

Moldovanu, Benny; Sela, Aner; Shi, Xianwen - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2008

We study optimal contest design in situations where the designer can reward high performance agents with positive prizes and punish low performance agents with negative prizes. We link the optimal prize structure to the curvature of distribution of abilities in the population. In particular, we...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504366

Contests with Ties

Cohen, Chen; Sela, Aner - In: Contributions to Theoretical Economics 7 (2007) 1, pp. 1398-1398

We study two-player all-pay contests in which there is a positive probability of a tied outcome. We show that the … the prize for winning. The implications of this result are twofold. First, in symmetric one-stage contests, the designer …-third of the prize for winning. Second, in multi-stage contests, the designer should not limit the number of stages (tie …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005579657

Favoritism in Contests: Head Starts and Handicaps

Kirkegaard, Rene - Department of Economics, Brock University - 2008

We examine a contest, modelled as an all-pay auction, in which a strong and a weak contestant compete, and where a contestant may suffer from a handicap or benefit from a head start. The former reduces the contestant's score by a fixed percentage; the latter is an additive bonus. The two...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005168870

Comparative Statics and Welfare in Heterogeneous All-Pay Auctions: Bribes, Caps, and Performance Thresholds

Kirkegaard, Rene - In: Topics in Theoretical Economics 8 (2008) 1, pp. 1417-1417

Comparative statics for all-pay auctions with two heterogeneous and privately informed bidders are analyzed. General results are provided for when one bidder becomes stochastically weaker. The comparative statics are fully characterized for truncations. Moreover, we show that expected revenue...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005178525

Silent Interests and All-Pay Auctions

Konrad, Kai A. - CESifo - 2005

If firms compete in all-pay auctions with complete information, silent shareholdings introduce asymmetric externalities into the all-pay auction framework. If the strongest firm owns a large share in the second strongest firm, this may make the strongest firm abstain from bidding. As a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005196292

Comparative Statics and Welfare in Heterogeneous Contests: Bribes, Caps, and Performance Thresholds

Kirkegaard, René - Department of Economics, Brock University - 2007

Comparative statics for contests with two privately informed and ex ante heterogeneous contestants are analyzed … part of the paper considers dynamic contests in which one bidder may endogenously be revealed to be weak. For example, the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005040600

Information acquisition in conflicts

Morath, Florian; Münster, Johannes - 2010

This paper considers incentives for information acquisition ahead of conflicts. First, we characterize the (unique) equilibrium of the all-pay auction between two players with one-sided asymmetric information where one player has private information about his valuation. Then, we use ou rresults...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010334005

College admissions with entrance exams: Centralized versus decentralized

Hafalir, Isa E.; Hakimov, Rustamdjan; Kübler, Dorothea; … - 2014

their efforts. We assume that student preferences are homogeneous over colleges. By modeling college admissions as contests …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010420879

College admissions with entrance exams: Centralized versus decentralized

Hafalir, Isa E.; Hakimov, Rustamdjan; Kübler, Dorothea; … - In: Journal of Economic Theory 176 (2018), pp. 886-934

We study a college admissions problem in which colleges accept students by ranking students' efforts in entrance exams. Students' ability levels affect the cost of their efforts. We solve and compare equilibria of “centralized college admissions” (CCA) where students apply to all colleges...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012143456