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When to disclose the number of contestants : theory and experimental evidence

Jiao, Qian; Ke, Changxia; Liu, Yang - In: Journal of economic behavior & organization : JEBO 193 (2022), pp. 146-160

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013189916

Ambiguous persuasion in contests

Feng, Xin - In: Journal of economic behavior & organization 220 (2024), pp. 182-201

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014552898

Multi-Stage Contests with Stochastic Ability

Konrad, Kia A.; Kovenock, Dan - Krannert School of Management, Purdue University - 2006

We consider the properties of perfectly discriminating contests in which players’ abilities are stochastic, but become … sequential contests with the same opponent (multi-battle contests) and with varying opponents (elimination tournaments) and show … ability dispersion selects such players into the contest and favors them in elimination contests. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005835353

Advances in Auctions

Kaplan, Todd R.; Zamir, Shmuel - Elsevier

As a selling mechanism, auctions have acquired a central position in the free market economy all over the globe. This development has deepened, broadened, and expanded the theory of auctions in new directions. This chapter is intended as a selective update of some of the developments and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011255421

Charity Auctions for the Happy Few

Bos, Olivier - Staatswissenschaftliches Seminar, Wirtschafts- und … - 2010

Recent literature has shown that all-pay auctions raise more money for charity than winner-pay auctions. We demonstrate that the first-price and second-price winner-pay auctions outperform the first-price and second-price all-pay auction when bidders are sufficiently asymmetric. To prove it, we...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008615457

Charitable asymmetric bidders

Olivier, Bos - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2011

Recent papers show that all-pay auctions are better at raising money for charity than first-price auctions with symmetric bidders and under incomplete information. Yet, this result is lost with sufficiently asymmetric bidders and under complete information. In this paper, we consider a framework...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009148030

CAPS IN SEQUENTIAL CONTESTS

Sela, Aner; Megidish, Reut - Economics Department, Ben Gurion University of the Negev - 2010

We study a sequential two-stage all-pay auction with two identical prizes. In each stage, the players compete for one prize and each player may win either one or two prizes. The designer may impose a cap on the players' bids in each of the stages. We analyze the equilibrium in this sequential...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008727312

ALLOCATION OF PRIZES IN CONTESTS WITH PARTICIPATION CONSTRAINTS

Sela, Aner; Megidish, Reut - Economics Department, Ben Gurion University of the Negev - 2010

We study all-pay contests with an exogenous minimal effort constraint where a player can participate in a contest only …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008727314

An elementary proof of the common maximal bid in asymmetric first-price and all-pay auctions

Fibich, Gadi; Oren, Gal - In: Economics Letters 122 (2014) 2, pp. 190-191

We prove that the maximal bid in asymmetric first-price and all-pay auctions is the same for all bidders. Our proof is elementary, and does not require that bidders are risk neutral, or that the distribution functions of their valuations are independent or smooth.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010743703

Single- and Double-Elimination All-Pay Tournaments

Deck, Cary; Kimbrough, Erik O. - Economic Science Institute (ESI), Argyros School of … - 2014

experiments have consistently found high levels of overbidding in contests, one might suspect that double-elimination tournaments …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010817395