This paper analyzes a model in which a firm's compliance with regulation is monitored by a supervisor. The supervisor exerts costly, unobservable effort to raise his inspection intensity, which leads to moral hazard. A non-compliant firm may exert effort in avoidance to reduce the probability of...

In this paper, we report experimental results providing a test of the auction theoretic approach to modeling legal systems (see Baye, Kovenock and de Vries, 2005 and Klemperer, 2003). Consistent with the theory, experimental evidence indicates that systems in which winners pay a low fraction of...

At least since Arrow (1962), economists have believed that strong property rights are necessary for firms to invest in innovation. This belief was a key principle underlying the Bayh-Dole Act, which gave universities the right to own and license federally funded inventions, because the...

The effects of appropriability on invention have been well studied, at least since Arrow (1962), but there has been little analysis of the effect of approbriability on the commercialization of existing inventions. Exploiting a database of 966 attempts by private firms to commercialize inventions...

This paper examines the feasibility of collusion in capacity constrained duopoly supergames. In each period firms simultaneously set a price-quantity pair specifying the price for the period and the maximum quantity the firm is willing to sell as this price. Under price-quantity competition...

Purpose – The aim of this paper is to study the role of bribery in subsidized credit markets in developing countries. First, the authors use the data to test whether more productive borrowers will pay larger or smaller bribes since the theoretical literature offers conflicting findings...

We examine commonly observed forms of payment, such as milestones, royalties, or consulting contracts as ways of engaging inventors in the development of licensed inventions. Our theoretical model shows that when milestones are feasible, royalties are not optimal unless the licensing firm is...

At least since Arrow (1962), the effects of appropriability on invention have been well studied, but there has been little analysis of the effect of appropriability on the commercialization of existing inventions. Exploiting a database of 805 attempts by private firms to commercialize inventions...

This paper contributes to the study of tacit collusion by analyzing infinitely repeated multiunit uniform price auctions in a symmetric oligopoly with capacity constrained firms. Under both the Market Clearing and Maximum Accepted Price rules of determining the uniform price, we show that when...