We explore the behavior of supervisors when a centralized agency has full power over all decisions regarding banks, but relies on local supervisors to collect the information necessary to act. This institutional design entails a principal-agent problem between the central and local supervisors...

Recommended readings (Machine generated): 1. Michael A. Klein (1971), 'A Theory of the Banking Firm', Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 3 (2) (Part 9), May, 205-18 -- 2. Douglas W. Diamond and Philip H. Dybvig (1983), 'Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance and Liquidity', Journal of Political...

This technical note leverages on the 2015 FSAP which concluded that the United States (U.S.) had a high degree of compliance with the Basel Core Principles (BCPs). The FSAP reviewed the progress achieved in addressing the main weaknesses previously identified and the main supervisory and...