In the presence of network externalities, we compare the stability of collusion under Bertrand and Cournot duopoly with … competition than under Cournot competition in the sense of wide range of network externalities; (ii) collusion in prices … (quantities) is more stable than in quantities (prices) if network externalities is strong (weak) …

In this paper, we aim to investigate the collusive stability in the presence of network externalities among firms with …

We investigate the effect of a ban on third-degree price discrimination on the sustainability of collusion. We build a …' discount factor has to be higher in order to sustain collusion in grim-trigger strategies under price discrimination than under …

This paper explores the effects that collusion can have in newspaper markets where firms compete for advertising as …) semi-collusion over advertising (with competition in the reader market), and iii) (full) collusion in both the advertising … and the reader market. We find that semi-collusion leads to less advertising (but higher advertising prices) and lower …

-group externalities makes two-sided collusion at a given profit level harder to sustain, and reduces the harm from collusion suffered by … magnitude of the cross-group externalities exerted on that side is sufficiently large (small). As a result, one-sided collusion …This paper explores the incentives for, and the effects of, collusion in prices between two-sided platforms. We …

power and the unpriced network externality. We find that full collusion (in the sense of joint profit maximization, acting …