We combine data from the Amsterdam secondary-school match with register data and survey data to estimate the effects of not being assigned to one's first-ranked school on academic outcomes and on a wide range of other outcomes. For identification we use that secondary-school assignment in...

We combine data from the Amsterdam secondary-school match with register data and survey data to estimate the effects of not being assigned to one's first-ranked school on academic outcomes and on a wide range of other outcomes. For identification we use that secondaryschool assignment in...

Our study presents the top-down stress testing framework currently used by the Magyar Nemzeti Bank. We run separate solvency and liquidity stress tests to analyse the ability of the banking system to absorb shocks and we present their results in our Report on Financial Stability. In the former,...

Stability and "no justified envy" are used almost synonymously in the matching theory literature. However, they are conceptually different and have logically separate properties. We generalize the definition of justified envy to environments with arbitrary school preferences, feasibility...

We review the process of redesigning the Israeli Psychology Masters Match (IPMM), with special attention given to the fellowships granted by the departments and the interplay between different programs within the same department. These features make the IPMM a two-sided matching with contracts...

We present direct field evidence of preference misrepresentation under deferred acceptance. A large fraction of highly educated participants, who had been informed about the strategy-proof nature of the mechanism in numerous ways, failed to play truthfully: they ranked a non-funded position...

Often market designers cannot force agents to join a marketplace rather than using preexisting institutions. We propose a new desideratum for marketplace design that guarantees the safety of participation: Dominant Individual Rationality (DIR). A marketplace is DIR if every pre-existing strategy...

We study college admissions markets, where colleges offer multiple funding levels. Colleges wish to recruit the best-qualified students subject to budget and capacity constraints. Student-proposing deferred acceptance is stable and strategy-proof for students, but the set of stable allocations...