We examine theoretically and experimentally how combining between-team and within-team incentives affects behavior in team tournaments. Theory predicts that free-riding is likely to occur when there are only between-team incentives, and offering within-team incentives may solve this problem....

In this paper we obtain sufficient conditions for the existence of a stable set of a weak tournament. We also provide necessary and sufficient conditions for unique stable sets as well as necessary and sufficient conditions for the stable sets to coincide with cores

We consider a stochastic tournament game in which each player is rewarded basedon her rank in terms of the completion time of her own task and is subject to cost of effort. When players are homogeneous and the rewards are purely rank dependent, the equilibrium has a surprisingly explicit...

This paper analyzes the implications of worker overestimation of productivity for firms in which incentives take the form of tournaments. Each worker overestimates his productivity but is aware of the bias in his opponent's self-assessment. The manager of the firm, on the other hand, correctly...

Tournaments consisting of iterative matches are a common mechanism for determining how to allocate a prize. For this reason it is important to understand the behavioral as well as the theoretical properties of different tournament structures. Given that laboratory experiments have consistently...

In this paper we deal with situations of collective contests between two groups over a private prize. A well known way to divide the prize within the winning group is the prize sharing rule introduced by Nitzan, 1991. Since its introduction it has become a standard in the collective contests...