The dissertation studies game theoretical models of competitive bidding on multi-unit auction markets. The analysis concerns both monopoly and oligopoly settings. A major part of the thesis deals with equilibrium bidding in variable supply auctions – trade mechanisms in which a monopoly seller...

In the variable supply auction considered here, the seller decides how many costumers with unit demand to serve after observing their bids. Bidders are uncertain about the seller's cost. We experimentally investigate whether a uniform or a discriminatory price auction is better for the seller in...

We examine an auction in which the seller determines the supply after observing the bids. We compare the uniform price and the discriminatory auction in a setting of supply uncertainty. Uncertainty is caused by the interplay of two factors: the seller's private information about marginal cost,...

Utilizing a news-based index of geopolitical risk (GPR) and using over 62 years of data, we find that GPR has a long-lasting negative impact on leverage. This result is robust to different model specifications, different proxies for leverage, several robustness tests, and survive after...

We develop a dynamic two-stage trade-off model with refinancing when earnings are mean reverting, expanding previous theoretical work focusing on non-stationary dynamics. Our model predicts a negative relation between profitability and leverage ratios at refinancing, providing a possible...