This paper deploys a novel experiment to compare four theories that explain both selfish and non-selfish cooperation. The four theories capture incomplete information (à la Kreps et al. (1982)) alongside the following four non-selfish motives: caring about others (Altruism), being conscientious...

This paper deploys a novel experiment to compare four theories that explain both selfish and non-selfish cooperation. The four theories capture incomplete information (à la Kreps et al. (1982)) alongside the following four non-selfish motives: caring about others (Altruism), being conscientious...

Do experimental subjects have consistent first and higher-order beliefs about others? How does any inconsistency affect strategic decisions? We introduce a simple four-player sequential social dilemma where actions reveal first and higher-order beliefs. The unique sub-game perfect Nash...

We design and implement the first real-effort experiment that can jointly estimate present bias (Ø) and sophistication (bØ), with separate preference parameters for money (Øm, bØm) and effort (Øe, bØe). In our study, participants chose to (and predicted to) complete 14% (and 10%) fewer...

We study the value of and the demand for instrumentally-valuable information in a simple decision environment where signals are transparently polarized. We find that in both information aggregation and acquisition, subjects use sophisticated heuristics to counter the polarization in signals....

In prosocial decisions, decision-makers are inherently uncertain about how their decisions impact others' utility - we call this interpersonal uncertainty. We show that people's response to interpersonal uncertainty shapes well-known patterns of prosocial behavior. First, using standard social...

In prosocial decisions, decision-makers are inherently uncertain about how their decisions impact others’ utility – we call this interpersonal uncertainty. We show that people’s response to interpersonal uncertainty shapes well-known patterns of prosocial behavior. First, using standard...

Present bias is the inclination to prefer a smaller present reward to a larger later reward, but reversing this preference when both rewards are equally delayed. Such behavior violates stationarity of temporal choices, and hence exponential discounting. This paper provides a weakening of the...

We evaluate Andreoni and Sprenger's (2012) data on choices made from Convex Time Budgets (CTB) for external consistency with the Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference (WARP) relative to the pairwise choice benchmark, and for internal consistency with respect to demand, wealth and impatience...

Halevy (2008) establishes a relation between non-standard behaviors in the domains of risk and time. A decision maker who believes that only present consumption is certain while any future consumption is uncertain exhibits diminishing impatience if and only if her preferences on the risk domain...