We introduce and study, both theoretically and empirically, the notion of `future self-proof' mechanisms, those in which boundedly rational individuals do not need to rationally forecast their own future actions (or those of others). We focus on elicitation mechanisms due to their importance and...

What kind of incentives optimize a worker's motivation and perfor- mance, especially in remote work settings? We recruit online workers to work for up to 45 minutes on tedious tasks over three days. We randomly assign them to individualistic (Solo) or one of two team incentives. Under our...

We design and implement the first real-effort experiment that can jointly estimate present bias (β) and sophistication (bβ), with separate preference parameters for money (βm, bβm) and effort (βe, bβe). In our study, participants chose to (and predicted to) complete 14% (and 10%) fewer...

Rational agents must perform backwards induction by thinking contingently about future states and actions, but failures of backwards induction and contingent reasoning are ubiquitous. How do boundedly-rational agents make decisions when they fail to correctly forecast actions in the future? We...

We study the value of and the demand for instrumentally-valuable information in a simple decision environment where signals are transparently polarized. We find that in both information aggregation and acquisition, subjects use sophisticated heuristics to counter the polarization in signals....

Do experimental subjects have consistent first and higher-order beliefs about others? How does any inconsistency affect strategic decisions? We introduce a simple four-player sequential social dilemma where actions reveal first and higher-order beliefs. The unique sub-game perfect Nash...