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We analyze a divisible good uniform-price auction that features two groups each with a finite number of identical bidders and present conditions under which a unique privately revealing equilibrium exists. We derive novel comparative static results highlighting that increases in transaction...
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-good Bertrand model intensifies competition: it lowers price and raises total surplus (but also makes profits go up). For some … Hansen's results for the relationship between uncertainty and competition in the Bertrand model. Second, it shows that his … asymmetry is large enough, however, industry profits are lower under uncertainty. This is in contrast to the known results and …
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We analyze a divisible good uniform‐price auction that features two groups, each with a finite number of identical bidders, who compete in demand schedules. In the linear‐quadratic‐normal framework, this paper presents conditions under which the unique equilibrium in linear demands exists...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012806389
Unlike standard auctions, we show that competitive procurement may optimally limit competition or use inefficient … auction to guard against firms bidding low to win the contract and then cutting back on effort. While competition helps reduce …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012421254
We analyze a divisible good uniform-price auction that features two groups each with a finite number of identical bidders. Equilibrium is unique, and the relative market power of a group increases with the precision of its private information but declines with its transaction costs. In line with...
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