In this paper we study the conditions under which socially responsible firms can develop a first-mover advantage. We consider a price-setting duopoly market with vertically and horizontally differentiated products, where firms can engage in socially responsible activities and thereby increase...

In this paper we develop a new view of organizations as disequilibrium systems. To introduce our ideas and some terminology we use a simple economic model which captures the interaction of a firm with its output market. We demonstrate that the decisions made by the management might cause regular...

The literature on voluntary disclosure in oligopolies concentrates either on Cournot markets where firms compete in quantities or on Bertrand markets where firms compete in prices. In this paper we study voluntary disclosure of managerial contract information in a Cournot-Bertrand duopoly where...

The observability of managerial contract information in duopolies with strategic delegation has been an issue of controversial discussion. In a recent paper, Baik and Lee (2019) endogenize the decision to disclose the details of managerial contracts and show that in equilibrium, the owners of...

In this paper we study the nature of incentive contracts and organizational modes in a game where the firms' owners endogenously determine the order of moves at the quantity-setting stage, can choose to delegate the production decision to a manager and write appropriate incentive contracts. It...

In contrast to authoritative budgeting, participative budgeting may improve the superior's knowledge and increase the subordinate's motivation, but often comes at the costs of padding budgets and slack building. Consequently, most analytical studies identify slack as one of the major costs of...

One objective of this chapter is to provide the reader with a clear and intuitive, but yet rigorous, description of the topic of strategic managerial incentives under oligopolistic competition. We further discuss the closely related issues of vertical separation where a manufacturer delegates...

In this paper we study the long run evolution of a mixed oligopoly market where profit-maximizing firms and socially concerned firms compete in quantities. We consider an evolutionary setting based on payoff-monotone selection dynamics with N-firm matching which captures the endogenous...

25 Years Real Options Approach to Investment Valuation: Review and Assessment -- Accounting-based Investment Incentives and Real Options -- The Evaluation of Venture Capital as an Instalment Option: Valuing Real Options Using Real Options -- Strategic Investment under Uncertainty: Merging Real...

This paper considers a strategic delegation setting with R&D spillovers in a Cournot market. The game we analyze has four stages. First, owners have the option to hire a manager. If they decide to delegate, then in the contracting stage they have to determine the optimal incentives for the...