We study the role of contract enforcement in shaping the dynamics of international trade at the firm level. We develop a theoretical model to describe how agents build reputations to overcome the problems created by weak enforcement of international contracts. We find that, all else equal,...

We study economies where improving the quality of institutions - modeled as improving contract enforcement - requires resources, but enables trade that raises output by reducing the dispersion of marginal products of capital. We find that in this type of environment it is optimal to combine...

In 2004, developing countries and civil society groups called for a new Development Agenda at the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO). After three years of debate, they secured the adoption by WIPO Member States of the 2007 WIPO Development Agenda, comprising 45 recommendations for...

This working paper is the first to analyse whether insights into problems of "regulatory ritualism" might inform contemporary debate on the merits and content of any new treatybased mechanism on the human rights responsibilities of business and financial actors. In 2015 a controversial...

Der vorliegende Beitrag diskutiert die Schnittstelle zwischen Recht und Ökonomik in der Wettbewerbspolitik. Aus einer ökonomischen Perspektive werden Ansätze zu einer institutionenökonomischen Analyse der Kartellrechtsdurchsetzung betrachtet. Im Rahmen einer positiven Institutionenökonomik...

Der vorliegende Beitrag diskutiert die Schnittstelle zwischen Recht und Ökonomik in der Wettbewerbspolitik. Aus einer ökonomischen Perspektive werden Ansätze zu einer institutionenökonomischen Analyse der Kartellrechtsdurchsetzung betrachtet. Im Rahmen einer positiven Institutionenökonomik...

The aim of this article is to take a critical look at how to perceive informal institutions within institutional theory. Douglas North in his early works on institutional theory divided the national institutional framework into two main categories, formal and informal institution or constraints...

In contemporary non-mainstream economic debate, it is widely thought that the functioning of a market economy needs a set of rules (i.e. institutions) which bind agents in their behaviour, allowing efficient outcomes. This idea is contrary to the General Equilibrium Model (GEM) where markets are...

This paper analyzes the determinants of local institutions and distribution of political power within a constant ‘macro-institutional’ setting. We show that characteristics of Brazilian municipalities related to institutional quality and distribution of political power are partly inherited...