Plott, Wit & Yang (2003) conduct a betting market experiment and find: First, information was aggregated. This suggests that traders updated their private information based on observed market odds. Second, a model based only on the use of private information seems to fit their data best. The...

We develop a model to study the observability of investors' information acquisition in financial markets. Relative to observable information acquisition, unobservable information acquisition leads to more information production if and only if the ratio of the information-acquisition cost to...

We study markets for information in the form of Bayesian signals. The main feature of such markets is that information is costly for the seller to acquire and cannot be verified by the buyer. We provide a full characterization of the set of all compensation schemes (viz., menus) which guarantee...

I analyze a manager's decision to disclose private information when the stock market is a source of information for corporate investment-making. A manager with long-term incentives discloses her private information only if it crowds-in informed trading and increases the manager's ability to...

We consider a mechanism design setting in which agents can acquire costly information on their preferences as well as others'. The choice of the mechanism generates informational incentives as it affects what information is acquired before play begins. A mechanism is informationally simple if...

I study the welfare and price implications of consumer privacy. A consumer discloses information to a multi-product seller, which learns about his preferences, sets prices, and makes product recommendations. Although the consumer benefits from accurate recommendations, the seller may use the...

Marketplace lending relies on screening and information production by investors, a major deviation from the traditional banking paradigm. Theoretically, the participation of sophisticated investors improves screening outcomes but also creates adverse selection among investors. In maximizing loan...

This paper reconsiders the general informed principal model with unilateral private information and common values. First, it identifies some fundamental properties of the Rothschild-Stiglitz-Wilson (RSW) allocation (i.e., the undominated for the principal allocation within the set of incentive...

I study the effects of language commonality (i.e., sharing a native language) on information production in financial markets. Using a hand-collected dataset on the prevalent dialects for 2,091 cities (counties) in China, I identify the effects of language commonality separately from those of...