Social preference models were originally constructed to explain two things: why people spend money to affect the earnings of others and why the income of others influences reported happiness. We test these models in a novel experimental situation where participants face a risky decision that...

We investigate expectation formation in a controlled experimental en-vironment. Subjects are asked to predict the price in a standard asset pricingmodel. They do not have knowledge of the underlying market equilibrium equa-tions, but they know all past realized prices and their own predictions....

The effects of stake size on cooperation and punishment are investigated using a public goods experiment. We find that an increase in stake size does neither significantly affect cooperation nor, interestingly, the level of punishment.

We conduct an experiment to test whether the size of a loss and the time in a losing position affect investors’ adaptation to the loss situation and, subsequently, whether this adaptation affects future investment decisions. As investors adapt to losses, their neutral reference point shifts...

Theoretical analyses of (optimal) performance measures are typically performed within the realm of the linear agency model. This model implies that, for a given compensation scheme, the agent’s optimal effort is unrelated to the amount of noise in the performance measure. In contrast,...

How do people react to setbacks and successes? I introduce a new measure of challenge-seeking to determine the effect of winning and losing in a competition on the willingness to seek further challenges. Participants in a lab experiment compete in two-person tournaments and are then informed of...

Economic behavior often takes place in groups of small numbers of peopleinteracting with each other (like work teams, neighborhoods, socialnetworks, etc.). Characteristic of such interaction is the development of(affective) interpersonal relationships, or social ties. According tosociologists,...

This discussion paper led to a chapter in: (K.R. Schenk-Hoppe & T. Hens (Eds.,)) <I>Handbook of Financial Markets: Dynamics and Evolution</I>, Amsterdam:North Holland/Elsevier, 2009.<P> Traditional finance is built on the rationality paradigm. This chapter discusses simple models from an alternative...</p></i>

We examine the force of three types of behavioral dynamics in quantity-setting triopoly experiments:mimicking the successful firm,following the exemplary firm, andbelief learning.Theoretically, these three rules of dynamic conduct lead to the competitive, the collusive, and the Cournot-Nash...

Theory predicts that default breach remedies are immaterial whenever contracting costs are negligible. Some experimental studies, however, suggest that in practice default rules do matter, as they may affect parties' preferences over contract terms. This paper presents results from an experiment...