Whilst the predecessor (Part I) to this paper addresses criticisms and challenges which have arisen in response to recent Basel Committee's initiatives aimed at addressing capital and liquidity standards, the present paper highlights further measures which are being introduced by the Basel...

A comparison of the neoclassical and the social economics paradigms, showing that the explicit inclusion of values enhances the explanatory value of social economics. This is illustrated by using literary examples to explain the difficulty the competitive model has in providing analyses and...

While public financial institutions (such as public development banks) are commonly associated with developing countries, in fact they are prevalent in the developed world as well. We study a sample of public financial institutions in industrialized countries and identify dominant trends in...

We examine self-enforcing honesty in firm-investor relations in an imperfect public information game. Minimum firm size requirements and moral hazard limit ability to raise outside capital, yielding a floor on personal wealth required to enter entrepreneurship. Credible auditing could create...

We study firms' corporate governance in environments where possibly heterogeneous shareholders compete for possibly heterogeneous managers. A firm, formed by a shareholder and a manager, can sign either an incentive contract or a contract including a Code of Best Practice. A Code allows for a...

This paper discusses and explores three situations under asymmetric information. First, companies with a higher level of corporate governance provisions compensate the owner–manager with a higher managerial reward for information disclosed. Second, there are significant and positive...

We analyze the degree of contract completeness with respect to staging of venture capital investments using a hand-collected German data set of contract data from 464 rounds into 290 entrepreneurial firms. We distinguish three forms of staging (pure milestone financing, pure round financing and...

This paper presents a contracting model of governance based on the premise that CEOs are the main promoters of governance change. CEOs use their power to extract higher pay or private benefits, and different governance structures are preferred by different CEOs as they favor one or the other...

This paper presents a contracting model of governance based on the premise that CEOs are the main promoters of governance change. CEOs use their power to extract higher pay or private benefits, and different governance structures are preferred by different CEOs as they favor one or the other...