Different momentum investors use different time horizons, or formation periods, to evaluate prior stock performance. We show that this heterogeneity has important consequences on asset returns. We provide evidence that heightened trading pressure due to the concurrence of the heterogeneous...

In this study, I demonstrate that international mutual funds can cause temporary stock price deviations from fundamentals in the countries they have positions in. I show that US mutual funds massively sold their Mexican equity when the recent crisis was developing, which then led to the average...

Attention to the most common firm disclosures, measured as the number of IP addresses accessing them on the SEC's servers, accelerates price discovery. Conversely, attention toward other concurrent filings has the opposite effect. By examining the submenu of reports that each IP address decides...

This study brings to light the new empirical fact that flows into US domestic equity mutual funds depend less on past fund returns when the risk-free rate declines. A one-percent drop in interest rates is associated with a decrease in the slope of the flow-performance relationship of around 10%....

We isolate frictions at the acquisition and integration stages of information processing by leveraging a policy that resulted in users of the Securities and Exchange Commission's online repository of company reports failing to consult the disclosures they had requested. Exploiting this plausible...

Clawback provisions entitle shareholders to recover previously-awarded incentive compensation from managers involved in accounting manipulation or misconduct. I study theoretically and empirically the impact of clawback provisions on the horizon of executive pay when shareholders face clawback...

I estimate a dynamic agency model to quantify the importance of dismissals in CEO incentives -vis-à-vis pecuniary compensation. The model features endogenous dynamics in deferred and flow compensation, as well as exogenous departures, and endogenous dismissals after poor firm performance. Thus,...

We empirically study how financial regulations generate corporate governance spillovers through the institutional ownership network. Exploiting the Regulation SHO Pilot experiment, we find a significant removal of anti-takeover provisions by Non-Pilot firms when their motivated monitors are more...