We examine the equilibrium wage and employment outcomes in a labor market model comprised of informationally constrained workers and employers whose labor market interactions have a non-zero impact on wages. The model endogenizes employment interactions between workers and employers in terms of...

Economic analysis has approached the problem of the neutrality of money through methods of supply-demand equilibrium in which changes in aggregate demand due to monetary or fiscal policy are equivalent to changes in the denomination of the monetary standard. We re-examine this question using...

We examine the equilibrium wage and employment outcomes in a labor market model comprised of informationally constrained workers and employers whose labor market interactions have a non-zero impact on wages. The model endogenizes employment interactions between workers and employers in terms of...

We study the implications of product and labor market imperfections for equilibrium unemployment under both exogenous and endogenous capital intensity. With endogenous capital intensity, stronger labor market imperfections always increase equilibrium unemployment. The relationship between the...

This paper develops a model of human capital investment in a frictional labor market with two-sided heterogeneity and liquidity constraints. The model generates underemployment in equilibrium: workers are employed in jobs for which they are over-qualified. Subsidizing education can decrease the...

We analyze whether different learning abilities of firms with respect to general equilibrium effects lead to different levels of unemployment. We consider a general equilibrium model where firms in one sector compete à la Cournot and a real wage rigidity leads to unemployment. If firms consider...

This paper contributes to the analysis of central vs. decentral (firm-level) labour market negotiations. We argue that during negotiations on a central scale employers and employees plausibly take output market effects into account, while they behave competitively during firm-level negotiations....

This paper contributes to the analysis of central vs. decentral (firm-level) labour market negotiations. We argue that during negotiations on a central scale employers and employees plausibly take output market effects into account, while they behave competitively during firm-level negotiations....