This article studies the provision of firm-sponsored general training in the presence of workers' career concerns. The model builds on the argument that the provision of general training reduces the employer's monopsony power. In this context, it is shown that the worker's implicit incentives to...

This paper studies the provision of firm-sponsored general training in the presence of workers’ career concerns. We use a model building on the argument that the acquisition of general skills increases the worker’s bargaining power vis-a-vis the employer. In this context, we show that the...

We study non-contractible firms' investment in general training in a model of frictional unemployment. Since training is vested in workers, firms' return to training is zero when a match ends. Consensual layoff provisions or large severance payments oblige firms to bargain efficiently over the...

This paper shows that in a search model where future employers of trained workers donot benefit from the training in other firms, investment into general training will only be below the competitive level if workers are credit constrained. If workers are credit constrained, then the training firm...

Workers will not pay for general on-the-job training if contracts are not enforceable. Firms may if there are mobility frictions. Private information about worker productivities, however, prevents workers who quit receiving their marginal products elsewhere. Their new employers then receive...

We provide a new explanation for why firms pay for general training in a competitive labor market. If firms are unable to tailor individual wages to ability, for informational or institutional reasons, they will pay for general training in order to attract better quality workers. The market...

Training programs for the unemployed typically involve teaching a specific skill to ease the transition into employment. However, in 1997, the Swedish unemployed could choose general/theoretical training through enrollment in one year of full-time studies at the upper secondary school level....

According to Becker [1964], when labour markets are perfectly competitive, general training is paid by the worker, who reaps all the benefits from the investment. Therefore, ceteris paribus, the greater the training wage premium, the greater the investment in general training. Using data from...