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Nonprofit organizations have been recently mandated to disclose the details of their executives’ compensation packages. Contract information is now accessible not only to current and prospective donors, but also to rival nonprofit organizations competing for donations in the fundraising...
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Management scholars have long stressed the importance of evolutionary processsesfor inter-firm cooperation but have mostly missed the promising opportunityto incorporate ideas from evolutionary theories into the analysis of collaborativearrangements. In this paper, we first present three rules...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005865886
In this paper we study the nature of incentive contracts and organizational modes in a game where the firms' owners endogenously determine the order of moves at the quantity-setting stage, can choose to delegate the production decision to a manager and write appropriate incentive contracts. It...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012726148
A robust result in the literature on strategic incentives pioneered by Fershtman and Judd (1987), Sklivas (1987), and Vickers (1985) is that under quantity competition firm owners induce their managers to make aggressive quantity choices in the product market. We revisit this result in a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012838379
The literature on voluntary disclosure in oligopolies concentrates either on Cournot markets where firms compete in quantities or on Bertrand markets where firms compete in prices. In this paper we study voluntary disclosure of managerial contract information in a Cournot-Bertrand duopoly where...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012831460
The observability of managerial contract information in duopolies with strategic delegation has been an issue of controversial discussion. In a recent paper, Baik and Lee (2019) endogenize the decision to disclose the details of managerial contracts and show that in equilibrium, the owners of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012835257
In contrast to authoritative budgeting, participative budgeting may improve the superior's knowledge and increase the subordinate's motivation, but often comes at the costs of padding budgets and slack building. Consequently, most analytical studies identify slack as one of the major costs of...
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