The literature on voluntary disclosure in oligopolies concentrates either on Cournot markets where firms compete in quantities or on Bertrand markets where firms compete in prices. In this paper we study voluntary disclosure of managerial contract information in a Cournot-Bertrand duopoly where...

This paper studies the emergence of firm asymmetry as an equilibrium outcome. We consider differentiated Cournot and Bertrand duopolies where firms endogenously select their organizational governance and their timing strategy. For Cournot competition asymmetric and symmetric equilibria may...

In this paper we study the behavior of optimal paths in dynamic programming models with a strictly convex return function. Such a model has been investigated in Dawid and Kopel (1997) who assume that the growth of a renewable resource is governed by a piecewise linear function. We prove that in...

In this note we reconsider the paper of Zhang and Zhang (1997), published in Managerial and Decision Economics, who analyze a strategic delegation model with R&D spillovers in an imperfectly competitive market. We were motivated to study their setup by a puzzling result given in their paper:...

We consider a repeated interaction between a manufacturing firm and a subcontractor. The relationship between the two parties is characterized (1) by moral hazard, and (2) by the fact that they do not have perfect knowledge about the base cost level of the project, which is carried out by a...

The time evolution of a dynamic oligopoly game with three competing firms is modeled by a discrete dynamical system obtained by the iteration of a three-dimensional non-invertible map. For the symmetric case of identical players a complete analytical study of the stability conditions for the...