We consider the pricing problem of a platform that matches heterogeneous agents using match‐contingent fees. Absent prices, agents on the short side of such markets capture relatively greater surplus than those on the long side (Ashlagi et al. 2017). Nevertheless we show that the platform need...

Based on the frictional matching framework, the article provides a theoretical model for a specific type of two-sided platform: the buyerseller transaction platform. In the model, the number of participants and the source of network externalities are endogeneously determined. The platform is...

The concept of two-sided markets tries to describe certain characteristics of today's big platforms. Despite attracting a great deal of academic interest, closer inspection shows that the theory suffers from a great deal of ambiguity. This paper attempts to highlight these fundamental...

‘This is the second book of a two-volume set that continues Adam Smith's work, using the tools mathematical, experimental, and behavioural economists have developed since 1776. As in the first volume, markets are not the central organising principle. Instead, attention centres on social...