In standard promotion tournaments, contestants are ranked based on their output or productivity. We argue that workers …'s ranking within a contest, not via his own leave status but that of his competitors, exploiting a policy reform. We show that …

In standard promotion tournaments, contestants are ranked based on their output or productivity. We argue that workers …'s ranking within a contest, not via his own leave status but that of his competitors, exploiting a policy reform. We show that …

Using a promotion signaling model in which wages are realistically shaped by market forces, we analyze how male … overconfident workers exert more effort to be promoted, which translates into a higher probability of promotion and superior wage … growth. Interestingly, workers who are not overconfident have higher expected ability conditional on promotion than …

vehicle of analysis is a promotion-signaling model in which wages are realistically determined by market forces. We find that … overconfident workers exert more effort to be promoted, and even though they have lower expected ability conditional on promotion …

vehicle of analysis is a promotion-signaling model in which wages are realistically determined by market forces. We find that … overconfident workers exert more effort to be promoted, and even though they have lower expected ability conditional on promotion …