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Dynamically stable matching
Doval, Laura - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 17 (2022) 2, pp. 687-724
I introduce a stability notion, dynamic stability, for two-sided dynamic matching markets where (i) matching opportunities arrive over time, (ii) matching is one-to-one, and (iii) matching is irreversible. The definition addresses two conceptual issues. First, since not all agents are available...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013273775
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Quick or cheap? Breaking points in dynamic markets
Mertikopoulos, Panayotis; Nax, Heinrich H.; Pradelski, … - 2019
We examine two-sided markets where players arrive stochastically over time and are drawn from a continuum of types. The cost of matching a client and provider varies, so a social planner is faced with two contending objectives: a) to reduce players' waiting time before getting matched; and b) to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012155362
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Quick or cheap? : breaking points in dynamic markets
Mertikopoulos, Panayotis; Nax, Heinrich H.; Pradelski, … - 2019
We examine two-sided markets where players arrive stochastically over time and are drawn from a continuum of types. The cost of matching a client and provider varies, so a social planner is faced with two contending objectives: a) to reduce players' waiting time before getting matched; and b) to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012154174
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Matching with externalities
Pycia, Marek; Yenmez, M. Bumin - 2021
We incorporate externalities into the stable matching theory of two-sided markets. Extending the classical substitutes … condition to markets with externalities, we establish that stable matchings exist when agent choices satisfy substitutability … externalities even though the standard fixed-point techniques do not apply. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012584081
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Matching with externalities
Pycia, Marek; Yenmez, M. Bumin - 2021
We incorporate externalities into the stable matching theory of two-sided markets. Extending the classical substitutes … condition to markets with externalities, we establish that stable matchings exist when agent choices satisfy substitutability … externalities even though the standard fixed-point techniques do not apply. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012588491
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Pairwise stable matching in large economies
Greinecker, Michael; Kah, Christopher - 2018
notion. In contrast to finite agent matching models, stable matchings exist under a general class of externalities. This …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011930739
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Pairwise stable matching in large economies
Greinecker, Michael; Kah, Christopher - 2018
notion. In contrast to finite agent matching models, stable matchings exist under a general class of externalities. This …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011791505
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A theory of simplicity in games and mechanism design
Pycia, Marek; Troyan, Peter - 2021
We introduce a general class of simplicity standards that vary the foresight abilities required of agents in extensive-form games. Rather than planning for the entire future of a game, agents are presumed to be able to plan only for those histories they view as simple from their current...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012584083
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School choice and loss aversion
Meisner, Vincent; Wangenheim, Jonas von - 2021
Evidence suggests that participants in direct student-proposing deferred-acceptance mechanisms (DA) play dominated strategies. To explain the data, we introduce expectation-based loss aversion into a school-choice setting and characterize choice-acclimating personal equilibria in DA. We find...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012698801
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Reciprocal preferences in matching markets
Opitz, Timm; Schwaiger, Christoph - 2023 - This version: February 2023
Agents with reciprocal preferences prefer to be matched to a partner who also likes to collaborate with them. In this paper, we introduce and formalize reciprocal preferences, apply them to matching markets, and analyze the implications for mechanism design. Formally, the preferences of an agent...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014478421