We study a coordination problem where agents act sequentially. Agents are embedded in an observation network that allows them to observe the actions of their neighbors. We find that coordination failures do not occur if there exists a sufficiently large clique. Its existence is necessary and...

We develop a dynamic framework of strategic information transmission through cheap talk in a social network. Privately informed agents have different preferences about the action to be implemented by each agent and repeatedly communicate with their neighbors in the network. We first characterize...

We develop a model of information exchange through communication and investigate its implications for information aggregation in large societies. An \textit{underlying state} determines payoffs from different actions. Agents decide which others to form a costly \textit{communication link} with,...

This paper considers a team in which production takes place sequentially and in which agents observe the actions taken by previous agents. We show that for such teams sharing rules exist which are balanced and induce efficient production as the unique equilibrium outcome. This in contrast to...

In terms of social networks, split graphs correspond to the variety of interpersonal and intergroup relations. In this paper we analyse the interaction between the cliques (socially strong and trusty groups) and the independent sets (fragmented and non-connected groups of people) as the basic...

This paper analyzes the situation, in which a continuum of identical players is engaged in more than one activity and each activity is characterized by a complementarity game. The player's intensity levels across different activities are linked in such a way that the marginal cost of increasing...

This paper introduces a mechanism design approach that allows dealing with the multiple equilibrium problem, using mechanisms that are robust to bounded rationality. This approach is a tool for constructing supermodular mechanisms, i.e. mechanisms that induce games with strategic...

The literature on games of strategic complementarities (GSC) has focused on pure strategies. I introduce mixed strategies and show that, when strategy spaces are one-dimensional, the complementarities framework extends to mixed strategies ordered by first-order stochastic dominance. In...

Fictitious play is the classical myopic learning process, and games with strategic complementarities are an important class of games including many economic applications. Knowledge about convergence properties of fictitious play in this class of games is scarce, however. Beyond dominance...