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Voluntary contributions with imperfect information: An experimental study

Levati, M.; Morone, Andrea; Fiore, Annamaria - In: Public Choice 138 (2009) 1, pp. 199-216

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005709373

Internet Auctions with Artificial Adaptive Agents

Unver, M. Utku - Society for Computational Economics - SCE - 2001

The growing number of auction sites on the internet enable game theorists to ask strategic questions on rationality of the observed bidding behavior. The most popular of them (eBay, Amazon.com, AuctionWatch.com and Yahoo!, etc.) operate under similar sets of rules with seemingly small...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005132879

A new approach to identifying generalized competing risks models with application to second-price auctions

Komarova, Tatiana - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2013

This paper proposes an approach to proving nonparametric identification for distributions of bidders' values in asymmetric second-price auctions. I consider the case when bidders have independent private values and the only available data pertain to the winner's identity and the transaction...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011126732

Resale in Second-Price Auctions with Costly Participation

Celik, Gorkem; Yilankaya, Okan - İktisat Bölümü, İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi - 2015

We investigate efficiency properties of sealed-bid second-price auctions with costly participation and resale. Each bidder chooses to participate in the auction if her valuation is higher than her optimally chosen participation cutoff. If resale is not allowed and the bidder valuations are drawn...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011115203

Precautionary Bidding in Auctions

Esö, Péter; White, Lucy - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2003

We analyse bidding behaviour in auctions when risk-averse buyers bid for a good whose value is risky. We show that when risk in the valuations increases, DARA bidders will reduce their bids by more than the appropriate increase in the risk premium. Ceteris paribus, buyers will be better off...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005114473

Optimal information disclosure in auctions

Bergemann, Dirk; Heumann, Tibor; Morris, Stephen; … - 2022

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012796946

Cross-game learning and cognitive ability in auctions

Giebe, Thomas; Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta; Kocher, Martin; … - In: Experimental economics : a journal of the Economic … 27 (2024) 1, pp. 80-108

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015045762

Over- and Under-Bidding in Tendering

van den Berg, Vincent - 2013

Consider a government tendering the right to operate, for example, an airport, telecommunication network, or utility. There is an 'incumbent bidder' who owns a complement or substitute facility, and one entering 'new bidder'. With a 'standard auction' on the payment to the government, the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010326483

Does the absence of human sellers bias bidding behavior in auction experiments?

Bartling, Björn; Gesche, Tobias; Netzer, Nick - 2016

second-price auctions. Overbidding is a robust finding in second- price auctions, and spite among bidders has been advanced … where bidders have preferences regarding both, the payoffs of other bidders and the seller's revenue. Overbidding is optimal … seller on overbidding. We conclude that overbidding is not an artefact of the standard experimental implementation of second …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011663184

Spite vs. risk: explaining overbidding

Kirchkamp, Oliver; Mill, Wladislaw - 2019

overbidding in auctions. As a workhorse we use the second-price all-pay and the first-price winner-pay auction. Both risk and …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012018322