We study a setting with search frictions in the marriage market and with incomplete contracting inside the family. Everyone prefers a partner that has a high income and is a perfect emotional match, but compromises must often be struck. A high-income earner may abstain from marrying a low-income...

This Paper considers the incentives for foreign direct investment in transformation countries if actual expropriation is the possible result of a conflict between multinational firms and local or national governments. The Paper compares threats of complete expropriation and of repeated...

We characterize the unique Markov perfect equilibrium of a tug-of-war without exogenous noise, in which players have the opportunity to engage in a sequence of battles in an attempt to win the war. Each battle is an all-pay auction in which the player expending the greater resources wins. In...

Merged firms are typically rather complex organizations. Accordingly, me rger has a more profound effect on the structure of a market than simply reducing the number of competitors. We show that this may render horizontal mergers profitable and welfare – improving even if costs are linear. The...

Kai Konrad bestätigt und verstärkt in seinem Kommentar die Kernthesen von Joachim Weimann. Er nimmt insbesondere Stellung zur Frage einseitiger Vorleistungen. Er referiert auch neuere Ergebnisse, die zeigen, dass solche Vorleistungen nicht nur zu einer internationalen Verlagerung der...