Similar Search Results

On the co-evolution of investment and bargaining norms

Bagnoli, Lidia; Negroni, Giorgio - 2010 - This version: June 2010

Two parties bargaining over a pie, the size of which is determined by their previous investment decisions. The … bargaining rule is sensitive to investment behavior. Two games are considered. In both, bargaining proceeds according to the Nash … behavior in the whole population both at the investment stage and at the distribution stage. A norm of investment and a norm of …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011737849

The effect of sunk costs on the outcome of alternating-offers bargaining between inequity-averse agents

Ewerhart, Christian - In: Schmalenbach business review : sbr 58 (2006) 2, pp. 184-203

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003308843

Discussion of "The effect of sunk costs on the outcome of alternating-offers bargaining between inequity-averse agents"

Gugl, Elisabeth - In: Schmalenbach business review : sbr 58 (2006) 2, pp. 204-208

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003308846

The effect of sunk costs on the outcome of alternating-offers : bargaining between inequity-averse agents

Ewerhart, Christian - 2004

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002349716

Discussion of 'the Effect of Sunk Costs on the Outcome of Alternating-Offers Bargaining between Inequity-Averse Agents'

Gugl, Elisabeth - 2009

In his article, Ewerhart argues that agents with inequity-averse preferences may overcome the hold-up problem. In this discussion, I focus on the underlying assumptions that he makes and point to some limitations of the model

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014058605