We characterise multi-candidate pure-strategy equilibria in the Hotelling-Downs spatial election model for the class of best-worst voting rules, in which each voter is endowed with both a positive and a negative vote, i.e., each voter can vote in favour of one candidate and against another one....

Relying on a formal theoretical model, Cox (1984; 1990a; 1990b; 1997) demonstrates that single member districts induce candidates toward policy positions at their constituency median while multimember districts encourage dispersion. We test this theoretical implication in the context of the Arizona state...

This paper presents an agent-based model of political competition over multiple heterogeneous electoral districts. Both the positions of district candidates and those of their national parties are endogenously determined and allowed to differ. Candidates are free to choose their position at the...

This essay reviews models of strategic mobilization and turnout, focusing on two important questions about the effects of electoral rules. First, how does the disproportionality of the electoral system affect the variance and mean of mobilization and turnout? This question has been investigated...

I investigate the impact of proportional representation (PR) and majoritarian rule (MR) on voter turnout and minority representation using theory and experiments. Numerous empirical studies have compared turnout across PR and MR. However, the empirical evidence is mixed. I show theoretically and...

We suggest a model of electoral competition between two parties which is extended by a third player : mass media. The classical one-dimensional competition model is changed by introducing an issue-specific sensibility-coefficient and by allowing for non-voting. The winner is selected by majority...