We study a principal-agent model in which the principal has a production technology. The efficiency parameter of the principal's technology is not known to the agent. Alternatively, the principal can make the agent use a technology from a different channel. By gathering information at a cost,...

We consider a general mechanism design setting where each agent can acquire (covert) information before participating in the mechanism. The central question is whether a mechanism exists which provides the efficient incentives for information acquisition ex-ante and implements the efficient...

We consider a general mechanism design setting where each agent can acquire (covert) information before participating in the mechanism. The central question is whether a mechanism exists that provides the efficient incentives for information acquisition ex-ante and implements the efficient...

We consider a general mechanism design setting where each agent can acquire covert information before participating in the mechanism. The central question is whether a mechanism exists which provides the efficient incentives for information acquisition ex-ante and implements the efficient...

Agents' valuations are interdependent if they depend on the signals of all agents. Previous literature has claimed that with interdependent valuations and multidimensional, but independent, signals, efficient auction design is impossible. This paper shows that, on the contrary, it is always...

We consider a monopolistic certifier selling certification services to a partially privately informed seller. The certifier can enable the seller to disclose her private information publicly, as well as gather additional market information about the good's quality publicly. We show that the...