We characterize the competitive equilibrium on the credit market when borrowers can strategically default. We assume that the audit is subject of errors of the two types and that lenders cannot commit ex-ante. We determine the penalty, the loan rate, the audit and strategic default...

We analyze in this paper the effect of age on the optimal dynamic strategy toward repeated independent gambles. When deciding to accept or to reject a lottery that is offered today, the gambler knows how many lotteries can yet be played in the future. We first characterize the optimal dynamic...

In this paper, I explain why it is sensible to discount future risk free costs and benefits at a rate of 4% in the short run and of 2% in the long run. The riskiness of future cash flows must be taken into account by imputing risk premia rather than by an arbitrary increase in the discount rate....

The Stern Review introduces very interesting tools from the theory of finance into the valuation of environmental investments. Stern measures the uncertain impact of climate change on intergenerational welfare as equivalent to an immediate and permanent drop in between 5% and 20% of aggregate...

In this paper, we describe the determinants of the socially efficient discount rate for the distant future. We provide various arguments in favour of a decreasing term structure. They are based on a precautionary argument given the rapid accumulation oif uncertainties affecting the future growth...

We characterize the competitive equilibrium on the credit market when borrowers can strategically default. We assume that the audit is subject of errors of the two types and that lenders cannot commit ex-ante. We determine the penalty, the loan rate, the audit and strategic default...

The aim of this paper is to examine the impact of inequalities and economic convergence on the efficient discount rate, in the absence of any risk-sharing scheme. We consider an economy in which the initial consumption level and the distribution of consumption growth are heterogeneous. The...

<Para ID="Par1">We examine the characteristics of the optimal insurance contract under linear transaction costs and an ambiguous distribution of losses. Under the standard expected utility model, we know from Arrow (<CitationRef CitationID="CR3">1965</CitationRef>) that it contains a straight deductible. In this paper, we assume that the policyholder is...</citationref></para>

We examine the characteristics of the optimal insurance contract under linear transaction cost and an ambiguous distribution of losses. Under the standard expected utility model, we know from Arrow (1965) that it contains a straight deductible. In this paper, we assume that the policyholder is...