This paper studies the effect of strategic complementarity among firms' lumpy investments on the fluctuations of aggregate investments. We investigate an extensive panel data set on Italian manufacturing firms. We first show that the fluctuations of fraction of firms that experience large...

We consider a common investment project that is vulnerable to a self-fulfilling coordination failure and hence is strategically risky. Based on their private information, agents { who have heterogeneous investment incentives - form expectations or "sentiments" about the project's outcome. We...

We analyze an entry game with multiple periods. In each period privately informed agents who have not yet joined decide whether to subscribe to a network. Subscribers derive benefits in future periods depending on the network size. We study the case where agents are sufficiently patient and show...

This paper explores the role of trade integration—or openness—for monetary policy transmission in a medium-scale New Keynesian model. Allowing for strategic complementarities in price-setting, we highlight a new dimension of the exchange rate channel by which monetary policy directly impacts...

The literature on supermodular optimization and games is surveyed from the perspective of potential users in economics. This methodology provides a new approach for comparative statics based only on critical assumptions, and allows a general analysis of games with strategic complementarities....

Multivariate Tobit models are estimated using German cross?sectional data to test whether strategic complementarities exist between expenditures in four different types of ICT?components. If two ICT?components are complements, they are correlated (provided that agents act rationally)....

One of the main subjects in the theory of economic growth is to explain regional differences among rates of growth. In this paper, we address this issue through the notion of the "underdevelopment trap". Such a trap may be the result of strategic complementarities between investment decisions...

In this paper we develop a fully game-theoretic version of the right-to-manage model of firm-level bargaining where strategic interactions among firms are explicitly recognized. Our main aim is to investigate how equilibrium wages and employment react to changes in the labour and product...

This paper demonstrates endogenous fluctuations of aggregate investments when firm-level investments follow an (S,s) policy and exhibit strategic complementarity. We present a method to characterize the aggregate fluctuations that arise from the interaction of the (S,s) policies. A closed-form...

This paper focuses on the importance of strategic complementarity in agents' payoff functions as a basis for macroeconomic coordination failures. We first analyze an abstract game and find that inefficient equilibria and a multiplier process may arise in the presence of strategic...